Cooperation in humans

Cooperation in humans
New experimental works and also theoretical ones.
Selected publications per year in decreasing order:
 L.-L Jiang, Z. Wang, C.-S. Zhou, J. Kurths, and Y. Moreno, “Assessing the impact of costly punishment and group size in collective-risk climate dilemmas”, submitted for publication.

 J. A. Molina, A. Ferrer, J. I. Giménez-Nadal, C. Gracia-Lazaro, Y. Moreno and A. Sanchez, “The effect of kinship on intergenerational cooperation: A lab experiment with three generations”, submitted for publication.

Z. Wang, M. Jusup, R.-W. Wang, L. Shi, Y. Iwasa, Y. Moreno and J. Kurths, “Onymity promotes cooperation in social dilemma experiments”, Science Advances, in press.

  J. Poncela-Casasnovas, M. Gutierrez-Roig, C. Gracia-Lazaro, J. Vicens, J. Gomez-Gardenes, J. Perello, Y. Moreno, J Duch, and A. Sanchez, “Humans display a reduced set of consistent behavioral phenotypes in dyadic games”, Science Advances 2, e1600451 (2016).

 J. A. Cuesta, C. Gracia-Lázaro, A. Ferrer, Y. Moreno, and A. Sánchez, “Reputation drives cooperative behaviour and network formation in human groups”, Scientific Reports  5:7843, doi:10.1038/srep07843 (2015).

 M. Gutiérrez-Roig, C. Gracia-Lázaro, J. Perelló, Y. Moreno, and A. Sánchez, “Behavioral transition with age in social dilemmas: From reciprocal youth to persistent response in adulthood”, Nature Communications  5:4362, doi:10.1038/ncomms5362 (2014).

 J. Grujic, C. Gracia-Lázaro, M. Milinski, D. Semmann, A. Traulsen, J. A. Cuesta, Y. Moreno and A. Sánchez, “A meta-analysis of spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments: Conditional cooperation and payoff irrelevance“, Scientific Reports 4, 4615 (2013).

 C. Gracia-Lázaro, J. A. Cuesta, A. Sánchez, and Y. Moreno, “Human behavior in Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments suppresses network reciprocity“, Scientific Reports 2, 325 (2012).

 C. Gracia-Lázaro, A. Ferrer, G. Ruíz, A. Tarancón, J. A. Cuesta, A. Sánchez, and Y. Moreno, “Heterogeneous networks do not promote cooperation when humans play a Prisoner’s Dilemma“, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 109, 12922-12926 (2012).

Abstract
The level of cooperation declines and is independent of the network of contacts. Fraction of cooperative actions (level of cooperation) per round during the experiment (A) and the control (B) for both networks and histograms of cooperative actions in the lattice (C) and the heterogeneous network (D). The histograms (C and D) show the number of subjects ranked according to the fraction of cooperative actions that they perform along the experiment in the two networks. PNAS.
Fig2

 Jelena Grujic, Constanza Fosco, Lourdes Araujo, José A. Cuesta y Angel Sánchez., “Social experiments in the mesoscale: Humans playing a spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma”, 
PLoS ONE 5 (11), e13749 (2010).